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Abstract
The existing literature has shown that less political uncertainty,
or more central bank transparency, may worsen macroeconomic per-
formance by raising the nominal wage. We extend this analysis to a
non-bayesian framework, where there is some aversion to ambiguity.
We show that the result found in the literature under the bayesian ap-
proach does not hold when the distance from the bayesian case is large
enough, or when a reduction in "Knigtian uncertainty" is considered.
Then, less uncertainty, or more transparency of the central bank, does
not raise the nominal wage and, as a consequence, macroeconomic per-
formance is not worsened (and is in general strictly improved).
JEL Classification: E58; D81
Keywords: political uncertainty; central bank transparency; Knight-
ian uncertainty; macroecomomic performance;
1 Introduction
The existing literature (Sorensen (1991) and Grüner (2002)) has shown that
less uncertainty on the objectives of policymakers may worsen macroeco-
nomic performance by raising the nominal wage in the labor market. The
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argument relies on the analysis of a game between a monopoly labor union1
and a central bank. The labor union sets the nominal wage before the central
bank chooses its monetary policy. As the weight the central bank attach to
its inflation objective relatively to its unemployment objective is not known
to the labor union, this creates some uncertainty on how the central bank
reacts to the nominal wage. It is then shown that more uncertainty decreases
the level of the nominal wage chosen by the labor union. As a consequence,
this may improve macroeconomic performance defined in terms of unemploy-
ment and inflation. The result implies that less political uncertainty might
be harmful. Alternatively, it may be interpreted as an argument against too
much transparency of the central bank2.
The argument was developed in the standard bayesian framework of ex-
pected utility maximization. However, some insuﬃciencies of this bayesian
approach have been pointed out. In particular, the Ellsberg paradox (Ells-
berg (1961)) has underlined the existence of some "aversion to ambiguity".
Therefore, more recently, new approachs have been proposed which can
take into account such an aversion to ambiguity, and which encompass the
bayesian approach as a special case3.
The purpose of this paper is to reevaluate the previous argument by using
such an extended framework of decision under uncertainty4. The central issue
we consider consists in asking how the macroeconomic equilibrium changes
when the amount of uncertainty varies, and to examine whether less uncer-
tainty is beneficial or not. Therefore, we need an approach which makes
1This is indeed an extreme case which simplifies the analysis and underlines more
clearly the results. A number n of labor unions can easily be introduced in the model,
which seems more suitable when empirical applications are considered (see Grüner et al.
(2005)).
2In the recent short theoretical review contained in the first part of Dincer and Eichen-
green (2007), this kind of argument is listed as one of the existing arguments against more
transparency of the central bank.
3Classical references are Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Schmeidler (1989). A survey
of some economic applications can be found in Mukerji and Tallon (2004). Knight (1921)
had already made a distinction between a situation of "risk" when there exists objective
probabilities and a situation of "uncertainty" when such probabilities do not exist.
4Schipper andWinschel (2004) have also examined the eﬀect of "Knightian uncertainty"
in a similar model of interaction between a labor union and a central bank. But this
uncertainty is modelled as strategic uncertainty in a Nash game, which constitutes a
diﬀerent approach. First, these authors consider an equilibrium where the two players
play simultaneously, while, in the literature cited and in the present paper, it is essential
for the argument that an equilibrium where the labor union plays first, be considered.
Second, in Schipper and Winschel (2004), in accordance with the literature on ambiguous
games, uncertainty is modelled as Knightian uncertainty on the strategy of the other
player, which leads to an equilibrium which generalizes the Nash equilibrium. Here, and
in the literature cited, uncertainty is on a parameter of the model.
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explicit the prior information available to the decision maker, and which al-
low us to compare and evaluate diﬀerent prior informations, while at the
same time taking into account the fact that the decision maker may have
an aversion to ambiguity. Gajdos et al. (2004) provides such an approach.
The uncertainty is represented both by a "central probability distribution"
and by some "imprecision of information" around this central distribution.
This leads to a criterion where the decision maker maximises a weighted av-
erage of two terms: the expected value under the central distribution, on
the one hand; and the minimum of the expected utility under the available
information, on the other hand.
While in the bayesian framework less uncertainty means a lower value of
the variance of the probability distribution, in the present extended frame-
work we can consider diﬀerent kinds of reduction in uncertainty. When we
consider either a decrease in the variance of the central distribution, or a
global decrease in uncertainty, we find results which are qualitatively similar
to those obtained in the literature under the bayesian approach, provided
that the distance from the bayesian case is not too large. Thus, in this sense,
the results obtained in the literature can be generalized. However, when we
consider a decrease in the imprecision of information (which we may call
a decrease in "Knightian uncertainty"), i.e. a shrinking of the set of the
possible distributions around the central distribution, we get the opposite
result that less uncertainty tends to lead to a lower nominal wage and to
improved macroeconomic performance. Furthemore, when the distance from
the bayesian case becomes large enough, even in either of the first two cases of
a lower variance of the central distribution or of a reduced global uncertainty,
the nominal wage does not rise and therefore macroeconomic performance
is in general also improved (and at least never worsened) . Therefore, in
all these last cases, the result obtained in the literature under the bayesian
approach does not hold. Less political uncertainty, or more transparency of
the central bank, does not raise the nominal wage and is never harmful. It
is in general even strictly beneficial in these cases.
The framework of analysis, which uses a model similar to that of Grüner
(2002), but extend it to a non-bayesian case, is presented in section 2. The
determination of the equilibrium nominal wage is considered in section 3.
The eﬀect of less uncertainty on the nominal wage is studied in section 4.
The "welfare" eﬀects, i.e. the eﬀfects on "macroeconomic performance", are
examined in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Framework of analysis
2.1 Model
The model is the same as in Grüner (2002)5. There is a unique labor union
in the labor market and we consider a two-stage game between this labor
union and the central bank. The labor union fixes the nominal wage at the
beginning of the period, and the central bank subsenquently determines the
inflation rate. The equations are the following:
UCB = −ψπ2 − u2 ; ψ > 0 (1)
ULU = w − π − A
2
u2 ; A > 0 (2)
u = a(w − π) ; a > 0 (3)
UCB and ULU represent the utility functions of the central bank (CB) and
the labor union (LU), respectively. The CB tries to stabilize both (log) in-
flation and unemployment around some desired levels, with a relative weight
given by ψ (π and u being the gap variables between (log) inflation and un-
employment and their desired levels, respectively). The LU wants to stabilize
(log) unemployment around the same level as the CB (with a weight given
by A), and to increase the (log) real wage w− π, where w is the (log) nomi-
nal wage variable (we use the normalization p−1 = 0, where p−1 is the (log)
price level of the previous period, which implies π = p). After the nominal
wage has been fixed, employment is determined by labor demand. This leads
to equation (3) , where unemployment is an increasing function of the real
wage6.
The equilibrium of the game is solved backward. In the second stage,
once w has been fixed by the LU, the CB chooses π which maximizes UCB
under the constraint (3) . This leads to the reaction function π = bw, where
b = a
2
a2+ψ . Using the notation γ ≡ 1− b, we get
γ =
ψ
a2 + ψ
(4)
We have 0 < γ < 1. The CB reaction function can then be written:
w − π = γw (5)
5This model is itself taken from the existing literature analyzing the interaction of labor
unions and the central bank, and its implications for monetary policy and the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium (Cukierman and Lippi (1999)).
6Note that by a suitable normalization of the nominal wage variable, the constant term
in equation (3) can always be taken equal to zero.
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In the first stage, the LU, when choosingw, takes into account the reaction
function (5) of the CB. Using (2), (3) and (5) we can write ULU as the
following function of γ and w:
ULU(γ,w) = γw − Aa
2
2
γ2w2 (6)
As ψ is not known with certainty by the LU, γ is also uncertain. We now
have to be more explicit on how this uncertainty on γ will be taken into
account.
2.2 Criterion under uncertainty
As indicated in the introduction, we will use an enlarged framework to de-
cision under uncertainty. For, the standard bayesian approach of expected
utility maximization7 has been shown not to be compatible with some ob-
served behavior of decision under uncertainty. In particular, Ellsberg (1961)
has underlined that individuals exhibit some "aversion to ambiguity". One
of the experiments involves asking individuals to bet on the color of a ball
drawn from an urn. There are two urns. Urn A contains 50 black balls and
50 red balls; while urn B contains 100 balls, which can be either black or
red, but with unknown proportion. The results of the experiment indicate
that individuals are indiﬀerent between betting on black or on red, but that
they prefer to bet on the color of a ball drawn from urn A rather than from
urn B. Such a behavior cannot be explained in the bayesian expected utility
framework.
Thus, some new approachs to uncertainty which can take into account
such an aversion to ambiguity have been developped8. In the present paper
we will more particularly use the approach of Gajdos et al. (2004), which
seems to be particularly convenient for our purpose. For we want to examine
the eﬀect of a change in the prior information toward less uncertainty, and
7The classical references are Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
8Two of them have more particularly retained attention. One is the the multiple prior
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), where, instead of having a unique prior probability
distributions, the decision maker have a set of possible probability distributions, and use
a maximin of utility approach. The other is developed in Schmeidler (1989). Individuals
continue to maximize some form of expected utility but use a "Choquet integral" with
respect to a non-additive probability (or "capacity"). Both approachs contain the bayesian
expected utility approach as a special case. In the multiple prior approach, this occurs
when the set of prior is reduced to a unique probability distribution. In the capacity-
Choquet integral approach, the bayesian case is obtained when the capacity is an additive
probability distribution, the Choquet integral becoming in that case identical to the usual
integral.
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to see whether such a change toward less uncertainty is beneficial or not.
Therefore we need an approach which makes explicit the prior information
available to the decision maker, and which allows us to compare and evaluate
diﬀerent prior informations9. Such an approach can be found in Gajdos et al.
(2004). In their framework, the prior information is characterized by [P, C],
where C is a "central probability distribution" around which there is some
"imprecision of information", which is expressed by the fact that all probabil-
ity distributions contained in the set P are considered as possible. Then the
preference of the decision maker concerns both the decision (or "act") f and
the prior information [P, C]: it is a binary relation on couples (f, [P, C]) .
The axiomatic approach, which in particular contains an axiom of "aversion
toward the imprecision of information", leads to a criterion which consists
in a weighted average of two terms: the expected value under the central
distribution C, on the one hand; and the minimum of the expected utility
under the (convex hull of the) set P of all possible probability distributions,
on the other hand (see Gajdos et al. (2004) Theorem 2 p.661)10. In the
present model, this implies that, for a given prior information [P, C] , the LU
chooses w which maximises ΩLU given by
ΩLU = θ
∙
min
P∈co(P)
EPULU
¸
+ (1− θ)ECULU (7)
where P and C are probability distributions on γ, and EP and EC represent
the corresponding expected value operators. The minimum in (7) is taken on
the convex hull co(P) of the set P of all possible probability distributions11.
Coeﬃcient θ, which belongs to [0, 1] , represents the degree of aversion to the
imprecision of information of the LU.
To simplify, we will define the set P of all possible distributions in the fol-
lowing parametrical way. Let S ⊆ [0, 1] be the support of the central distribu-
tion C, and letR (S) be the set of all probability distributions with support S.
Then, we consider the set P defined by P = {(1− δ)C + δP 0 : P 0 ∈ R (S)} ,
where δ is a given parameter satisfying 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. This means that any
posssible distribution belonging to P can be written as a weighted average
of the central distribution C and of a distribution with support S (which
9In the axiomatics developed in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), or in Schmeidler (1989),
the information available to the decision maker is not made explicit.
10A criterion which involves a weighted average between an expected utility under a
given distribution and a minimum of expected utilities under a set of alternative dis-
tributions, can also be obtained under the "capacity-Choquet integral" approach (see
Eichberger and Kelsey (1999)).
11Note that the central distribution is assumed to belong to the convex hull co(P) of P.
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implies that the support of any possible distribution is also S)12. Parameter
δ determines the width of the set P and is an indicator of the imprecision
of the information. In the case δ = 0, we have P = {C} , and the set P is
reduced to the central distribution C. In the opposite extreme case δ = 1, we
have P = R (S) , and the set P becomes identical to the set of all probability
distributions with support S.
From this definition ofP, for any P belonging toP we getEP = (1− δ)EC+
δEP 0 , where we have P 0 ∈ R (S) . Note also that P thus defined is a convex
set13, which implies co(P) = P. This gives
minP∈co(P)EPULU = δminP∈R(S)EPULU + (1− δ)ECULU . Substituting
this expression into (7), we get, as a criterion, the maximisation of ΩLU given
by:
ΩLU = α
∙
min
P∈R(S)
EPULU
¸
+ (1− α)ECULU (8)
where we have
α = θδ (9)
From (8) , we see that, by defining P in such a way, the minimization part
of ΩLU can be taken on the set R (S) of all probability distributions with
support S (while in (7) it was taken on the (convex hull of the) set P itself).
Note, however, that coeﬃcient α which appears in (8) is equal to θδ (while
in (7) we had θ instead). Thus, coeﬃcient α is an increasing function both
of the imprecision of information, represented by parameter δ, and of the
aversion toward the imprecision of information, represented by parameter θ.
The standard bayesian approach is obtained as a special case when we
have α = 0. For, from (8) , the criterion then becomes equivalent to the
maximization of the expected utility under the central distibution C. From
(9) , this case occurs either when there is no imprecision of information (δ =
0), or when there is no aversion toward the imprecision of information (θ = 0).
Parameter α can be considered as representing the distance from the bayesian
case. In the opposite extreme case α = 1 (which requires that we have both
θ = 1 and δ = 1), we have a maximin criterion on the set R (S) of all
probability distributions with support S.
Let γ0, where 0 < γ0 < 1, be the mean of the central distribution C. To
simplify the analysis, we will further assume that the support S of C is a
symmetric interval around γ0. We have S = [γ0 − µ, γ0 + µ] , where µ > 0
12Such a definition is similar to the one used in Epstein and Wang (1994), where the
set of probability distributions considered is defined by "contamination" from a given
distribution.
13From the definition of P we can easily see that if P1 and P2 belong to P, then, for
any ξ satisfying 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1, ξP1 + (1− ξ)P2 also belongs to P
7
is a parameter which represents the length of that support. As we have
0 < γ < 1, parameter µ has to satisfy the inequalities µ < γ0 and µ < 1−γ0.
3 Nominal wage under uncertainty
The nominal wage chosen by the LU under uncertainty is the value bw of w
which maximizes ΩLU given by (8) , where R (S) is the set of all probability
distributions with support S = [γ0 − µ, γ0 + µ] .
As a first step, let w (γ) be the nominal wage chosen by the LU under
certainty when γ is known. Maximizing ULU given (6) gives
w (γ) =
1
Aa2γ
(10)
Let σ2γ > 0 be the variance of the central distribution C. Note that we
must have σ2γ ≤ µ2. Then, the nominal wage bw chosen by the LU under
uncertainty is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Consider the threshold value α∗, which satifies 0 < α∗ ≤ 1,
and is given by
α∗ =
σ2γ
µ(γ0 − µ) + σ2γ
(11)
In the case α < α∗, we have
bw = 1
Aa2
γ0 − αµ
α (γ0 − µ)2 + (1− α) (γ20 + σ2γ)
(12)
In that case, we have 0 < bw < w (γ0) , and therefore uncertainty reduces the
nominal wage. However, the larger α is, the smaller this reduction is. For
we have ∂ bw∂α > 0.
In the case α ≥ α∗, uncertainty has no eﬀect: we have bw = w (γ0) .
See Appendix 1 for the proof. Proposition 1 indicates that uncertainty
reduces the nominal wage but that this eﬀect is dampened when we are not in
the bayesian case α = 0. And the greater α is (i.e. the greater the departure
from the bayesian case is), the smaller the decrease in the nominal wage due
to uncertainty is. The eﬀect of uncertainty even disappears when α becomes
greater or equal than some threshold value α∗. For, in that case, bw becomes
always equal to w (γ0) , which is the value of the nominal wage which would
occur if γ were known to be equal to γ0 with certainty.
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These results can be explained more intuitively in the following way. Letbw0 be the solution in the bayesian case α = 0, where the LU maximizes the
expected value of its utility under the central distribution. We have 0 < bw0 <
w (γ0) , which is in accordance with the result found in the literature that
more uncertainty implies a lower nominal wage. In the case α > 0, according
to (8) , the LU also considers what happens in the worst case. When we have
0 < w < w (γ0) , the worst case occurs when γ is equal to its lowest value
γ0 − µ with probability one. For, the real wage, which, from (5), is equal to
γw, is then the furthest apart from the value that maximizes ULU , which,
according to (6) , is equal to γw = 1Aa2. . As a consequence, when α starts
increasing from zero, the optimal wage bw becomes a weighted average of bw0
and w (γ0 − µ) . Formally, (12) can be written:
bw = (1− κ) bw0 + κw (γ0 − µ) (13)
where κ, which satisfies 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1, is given by
κ =
α (γ0 − µ)2
α (γ0 − µ)2 + (1− α) (γ20 + σ2γ)
(14)
and where, from (12) with α = 0, and from (10), we get
bw0 = 1Aa2 γ0γ20 + σ2γ ; w (γ0 − µ) = 1Aa2 1γ0 − µ (15)
As, from (10) , we have w (γ0 − µ) > w (γ0) > bw0, this raises bw above bw0.
The greater α is, the greater the weight κ given to w (γ0 − µ) is, and therefore
the higher bw is. When α reaches some threshold value α∗, then bw becomes
equal to w (γ0) . However, bw cannot go above w (γ0) . The reason is that when
we have w > w (γ0) , then the worst case changes: it is now obtained for γ
equal to its greatest value γ0+µ. As, from (10) , we have w (γ0 + µ) < w (γ0) ,
a value of bw greater than w (γ0) can never be a solution. Therefore, for values
of α greater than α∗, the optimal nominal wage bw stays at the level w (γ0) ,
where both γ = γ0− µ and γ = γ0 + µ are worst cases. The discontinuity in
the worst cases at w (γ0) allows w (γ0) to be a solution when we have α > α
∗.
4 Eﬀect on the nominal wage of less uncer-
tainty
We will now consider the issue of how a lower amount of uncertainty af-
fects the nominal wage. In the bayesian framework of Sorensen (1991) and
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Grüner (2002), reduction in uncertainty means a decrease in the variance
of the prior distribution, and the result obtained was that less uncertainty
has the unfavorable eﬀect of increasing the nominal wage. The present en-
larged framework allows us to make a distinction between diﬀerent kinds of
reduction in uncertainty. For the amount of uncertainty around γ0 is now
chacacterized by the three parameters
¡
σ2γ, µ, δ
¢
. We can therefore examine
diﬀerent cases, depending on which parameter(s) is (are) concerned by the
change in uncertainty we consider.
We will consider three cases. The first is a decrease in the variance of
the central distribution alone. The second is a "global" reduction in uncer-
tainy, where both the standard deviation of the central distribution and the
length of the support of the set of possible distributions decrease propor-
tionally. In these two cases, it will be shown that the nominal wage either
increases or stays unchanged. Therefore, the results obtained in these two
cases may be seen as some generalization of the results obtained in the litera-
ture under the bayesian approach. In the third case, the central distribution
is unchanged but there is a decrease in the imprecision of information around
the central distribution (this case could be labelled a decrease in "Knight-
ian uncertainty"). We will show that, on the contrary, such a reduction in
uncertainty leads to a lower nominal wage.
In the notations we use, we will make explicit the dependence of the
endogenous variables on the uncertainty parameters
¡
σ2γ, µ, δ
¢
. Thus, from
proposition 1, we will write bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢ and α∗(σ2γ, µ), where the dependence
of bw on δ goes through its dependence on α in (12) and from the equality
α = θδ, given by (9) .
4.1 Decrease in the variance of the central distribution
We first consider the case where the variance of the central distribution σ2γ
decreases while the other two parameters µ and δ stay constant. We get the
following result:
Proposition 2 When the variance of the central distribution decreases from
σ2γ,1 to σ
2
γ,2 < σ
2
γ,1 :
- When initially we have α < α∗(σ2γ,1, µ), the nominal wage (strictly)
increases: we have bw ¡σ2γ1, µ, δ¢ < bw ¡σ2γ2, µ, δ¢ .
- When initially we have α ≥ α∗(σ2γ,1, µ), the nominal wage is unchanged:
we have bw ¡σ2γ1, µ, δ¢ = bw ¡σ2γ2, µ, δ¢ = w (γ0) .
See appendix 2 for the proof. Proposition 2 indicates that as long as α
is smaller than the threshold value α∗(σ2γ,1, µ) for the initial situation, then
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any decrease in the variance of the central distribution raises the nominal
wage14. When α is greater or equal to this threshold value, a decrease in
this variance has no eﬀect. This result constitutes a first generalization to
the case α 6= 0 of the result obtained in the literature under the bayesian
approach (i.e. only in the case α = 0).
4.2 Global decrease in uncertainty
We now consider the case where, starting fom an initial situation, uncertainty
declines "globally": both the standard deviation of the central distribution σγ
and the length of the support of possible distributions, given by µ, decrease
proportionally, parameter δ being unchanged15. Therefore, we consider the
eﬀect of a decrease in both σ2γ and µ, while the ratio λ ≡
σ2γ
µ2 stays constant
16.
As we have 0 < σ2γ ≤ µ2, we have 0 < λ ≤ 1. We get the following result:
Proposition 3 Consider a global decrease in uncertainty: while parameter
δ is unchanged, the variance of the central distribution decreases from σ2γ,1 to
σ2γ,2 < σ
2
γ,1, and the length µ of the support decreases from µ1 to µ2<µ1, in
such a way as to keep the ratio λ ≡ σ
2
γ
µ2 constant. Then:
- When initially we have α < α∗(σ2γ,1, µ1), the nominal wage (strictly)
increases: we have bw ¡σ2γ1, µ1, δ¢ < bw ¡σ2γ2, µ2, δ¢ .
- When initially we have α ≥ α∗(σ2γ,1, µ1), the nominal wage is unchanged:
we have bw ¡σ2γ1, µ1, δ¢ = bw ¡σ2γ2, µ2, δ¢ = w (γ0) .
See appendix 3 for the proof. Proposition 3 gives the same qualitative
results as proposition 2 and constitutes a further generalization of the result
obtained in the literature under the bayesian approach17. We see that in
14According to the interpretation in terms of a weighted average given by (13) , we can
see from (14) and (15) that a decrease in σ2γ raises both bw0 and the weight κ. Both eﬀects
contribute to a higher value of bw in the case α < α∗.
15According to the definition of the set of the possible distributions P we have taken,
then, with parameter δ unchanged, the support and standard deviation of the possible
distributions are also reduced proportionally. It is therefore justified to consider that this
case is a "global" reduction in uncertainty.
16As an example, take the case where we reduce the value of µ when C is the uniform
distribution with support [γ0 − µ, γ0 + µ] . Then σγ decreases proportionally, and we have
λ = 13 . In the same way, a decrease in µ in the case of a symmetric triangular distribution
with support [γ0 − µ, γ0 + µ] would correspond to a global reduction in uncertainty with
λ = 16 .
17The qualitative results of proposition 3 cannot be deduced by simply considering
the separate qualitative eﬀects on bw0, w (γ0 − µ) and κ given in the weighted average
interpretation of (13). From (14) and (15) we can see that bw0 is raised by a smaller value
11
order to determine the eﬀect of a decrease in the variance of the central
distribution on the nominal wage, it does not matter qualitatively whether
the length µ of the support of the possible distributions is held constant, or
alternatively is decreased proportionally to the standard deviation σγ of the
central distribution.
4.3 Decrease in the imprecision of information
Alternatively, we could keep constant the central distribution and examine
what happens when the set of possible distributions gets smaller around the
central distribution. This corresponds to a decrease in parameter δ, holding
σ2γ and µ constant, and can be interpreted as a decrease in the imprecision
of information18, or in "Knightian uncertainty". From (9) , when we have
θ 6= 0, this lowers parameter α. According to proposition 1, this reduces the
nominal wage, or leaves it unchanged. More precisely, we get:
Proposition 4 Consider a decrease in the imprecision of information around
the central distribution, given by a lower value of parameter δ: we have
δ1 > δ2 ≥ 0. In the non-bayesian case θ 6= 0, we get:
- When after the reduction in uncertainty we have θδ2 < α∗(σ2γ, µ), then
the nominal wage is (strictly) lower: we have bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ1¢ > bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ2¢ .
- When after the reduction in uncertainty we have θδ2 ≥ α∗(σ2γ, µ), then
the nominal wage is unchanged and stays at its value under certainty: we
have bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ1¢ = bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ2¢ = w (γ0) .
In the bayesian case θ = 0 the nominal wage is always unchanged.
See appendix 4 for the proof. According to proposition 4, a decrease in
uncertainty that consists in a reduction in the imprecision of information
gives an eﬀect on the nominal wage which tends to be opposite to that
obtained in the two previous cases of reduction in uncertainty considered.
It is therefore also opposite to the eﬀect emphasized in the literature. For,
when it is changed, the nominal wage is now lower instead of higher. Thus,
if less political uncertainty, or more transparency of the central bank, mainly
takes the form of reduced imprecision of information (i.e. of less "Knightian
uncertainty"), the nominal wage will never be increased: it will be reduced,
or at most unchanged.
of σ2γ , and that the weight κ is increased both by the decrease in σ
2
γ and by the lower
value of µ. These eﬀects tend to raise the nominal wage. However, w (γ0 − µ) is lowered
by a smaller value of µ, which gives the opposite eﬀect of reducing the nominal wage. The
resulting eﬀect cannot therefore be inferred from these qualitative eﬀects alone.
18As the central distribution is unchanged, Gajdos et al. (2004), p.652 call it a "center
preserving decrease in imprecision of information".
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5 Eﬀect on macroeconomic performance
5.1 Criterion
In order to examine whether it would be beneficial to have less uncertainty,
through less political uncertainty or more transparency of the central bank,
we have to go further than the eﬀect on the nominal wage: we should consider
its eﬀect on "macroeconomic performance" (or its "welfare eﬀect"). For that,
following Sorensen (1991), we will assume that the utility function UMP used
to evaluate macroeconomic performance is that of the central bank where the
weight ψ0 corresponds to the expected value γ0. We take
UMP = −ψ0π2 − u2 (16)
where, from (4) , ψ0 is given by ψ0 =
γ0
1−γ0
a2. Then, using (3) and (5) , we get
UMP = −a2
∙
γ0
1− γ0
(1− γ)2 + γ2
¸
w2 (17)
As γ is uncertain, the criterion that society uses to evaluate macroeco-
nomic performance should take into account this uncertainty. As we have
indicated in section 2, the approach to uncertainty we consider, with its im-
plied criterion, allows us to evaluate and compare diﬀerent prior informations.
Thus, for such a comparison, we will use a criterion similar to (8) which is
ΩMP = α
∙
min
P∈R(S)
EPUMP
¸
+ (1− α)ECUMP (18)
where, as in (9) , α is equal to θδ, and where R (S) is the set of all probabil-
ity distributions with support [γ0 − µ, γ0 + µ] . We assume that society has
the same information [P, C] as the labor union, given by the same parame-
ters (γ0, σ
2
γ, µ, δ). For simplicity, we also assume that society has the same
aversion toward imprecision of information parameter θ as the labor union.
As before, we want to consider the eﬀect of a decrease in uncertainty,
where this uncertainty is characterized by the three parameters
¡
σ2γ, µ, δ
¢
.
Thus, define bΩMP ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢ as the value of ΩMP under ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢ when the
nonimal wage w is equal to the level bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢ chosen by the labor union.
Then, the uncertainty of the prior information characterized by
¡
σ2γ,2, µ2, δ2
¢
is (strictly) preferred to that characterized by
¡
σ2γ,1, µ1, δ1
¢
if and only if
we have bΩMP ¡σ2γ,2, µ2, δ2¢ > bΩMP ¡σ2γ,1, µ1, δ1¢ (with indiﬀerence in case of
equality).
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We can give a more explicit expression to bΩMP ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢ . First, con-
sider the term minP∈R(S)EPUMP in (18). From (17), this is equivalent to
maxP∈R(S)
h
γ0
1−γ0
(1− γ)2 + γ2
i
. As the term into brackets is a quadratic con-
vex function of γ, the maximum can be attained only on the set of the two
extreme distributions where we have γ = γ0 − µ with probability one, or
γ = γ0 + µ with probability one. It can be seen that γ = γ0 − µ and
γ = γ0 + µ actually always give the same value to
γ0
1−γ0
(1− γ)2 + γ2. Thus,
replacing γ by γ0 − µ, or equivalently by γ0 + µ, in (17) we get
min
P∈R(S)
EPUMP = −a2
µ
γ0 +
µ2
1− γ0
¶
w2 (19)
Second, from (17) , we obtain ECUMP = −a2
³
γ0 +
σ2γ
1−γ0
´
w2. Substitut-
ing this expression and (19) into (18) , and replacing w by bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢ , we
get bΩMP ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢ = −a2Q(σ2γ, µ) £ bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢¤2 (20)
where Q(σ2γ, µ) is given by
Q(σ2γ, µ) = γ0 +
αµ2 + (1− α)σ2γ
1− γ0
(21)
5.2 Eﬀect of a decrease in uncertainty
Equation (20) indicates that there are two channels through which a reduc-
tion in uncertainty can aﬀect macroeconomic performance. The first goes
through the nominal wage bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢. As we have bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢ > 0, from
(20) this implies that a rise in the nominal wage is unfavorable, while a de-
crease is beneficial. In the last section we have seen that the sign of this
eﬀect depends on the kind of reduction in uncertainty we consider. The sec-
ond channel goes through coeﬃcient Q(σ2γ, µ). From (21) , this coeﬃcient is
a non decreasing function of σ2γ and µ. Therefore, when it exists, the eﬀect
going through this second channel can only be favorable.
5.2.1 Decrease in the variance of the central distribution
As before, we first consider the eﬀect of a lower variance of the central dis-
tribution σ2γ, while the other parameters µ and δ are left unchanged. In the
case where initially we have α ≥ α∗, according to proposition 2, the nomi-
nal wage is unchanged. As, in general, coeﬃcient Q(σ2γ, µ) is reduced, this
implies that macroeconomic performance is then improved. However, in the
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case where initially we have α < α∗, proposition 2 indicates that the nominal
wage increases, which can counterbalance the smaller coeﬃcient Q(σ2γ, µ).
We will consider a marginal decrease in σ2γ. Macroeconomic performance
is worsened if we have ∂bΩMP∂σ2γ > 0, and improved if we have ∂bΩMP∂σ2γ < 0. We
get:
Proposition 5 Consider a marginal decrease in the variance σ2γ of the cen-
tral distribution C, holding µ and δ constant.
- In the case where initially we have α < α∗(σ2γ, µ), then
∂bΩMP
∂σ2γ
has the
same sign as Z given by
Z = 2γ0 − 3γ20 + σ2γ +
¡
µ2 − σ2γ + 2γ0µ
¢
α (22)
Therefore, macroeconomic performance may be either worsened or improved,
depending on the parameters of the model. When we have Z > 0 it is
(strictlty) worsened, while when we have Z < 0 it is (strictly) improved (with
no eﬀect on macroeconomic performance when Z = 0).
- In the case where initially we have α ≥ α∗(σ2γ, µ), we have ∂
bΩMP
∂σ2γ
< 0
when we have α 6= 1, and consequently macroeconomic performance is then
(strictly) improved. In the extreme case α = 1, which occurs when we have
both θ = 1 and δ = 1 (and which corresponds to the maximin case) we have
∂bΩMP
∂σ2γ
= 0, and macroeconomic performance is then unchanged.
See appendix 5 for the proof. Proposition 5 underlines that when σ2γ
decreases, it is possible that macroeconomic performance deteriorates. This
was the result emphasized by Sorensen (1991) in the bayesian case. Such
a possibility is now seen to hold also in the non-bayesian case α 6= 0, and
proposition 5 has explicited the conditions (which are that both inequali-
ties α < α∗(σ2γ, µ) and Z > 0 are satisfied) under which macroeconomic
performance worsens.
But proposition 5 also implies that, for some values of the parameters
of the model, macroeconomic performance may also improve. First, it says
that this could occur even in the bayesian case α = 0 studied in the litera-
ture. For, from (22) , in that case the inequality Z > 0 becomes equivalent
to γ0 (2− 3γ0) + σ2γ > 0. When we have γ0 ≤ 23 , we always have Z > 0,
which means that reduced uncertainty always worsens macroeconomic per-
formance. However, in the case γ0 >
2
3
, we have the opposite result if σ2γ
is not too large, i.e. if we have σ2γ < γ0 (3γ0 − 2) : then, macroeconomic
performance is improved. We can try to relate this result to the findings
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obtained by Sorensen (1991) under the bayesian approach19. This author
also found that reduced political unertainty may either improve or worsen
macroeconomic performance. However, in Sorensen (1991), this ambiguity
of the result was entirely due to the presence of shocks to the unemploy-
ment equation. But in the present analysis we do not have such shocks. In
that case, the analysis of Sorensen (1991) woul actually imply that reduced
uncertainty always worsens macroeconomic performance20. Thus, there is
a discrepancy between Sorensen’s result and ours. However, we can note
that Sorensen made the simplifying assumtion that on average the relative
weight to inflation stabilization relatively to unemployment given by the pol-
icymaker is equal to one, and also that the coeﬃcient of the real wage in the
unemploment equation is equal to one. In our model, this would mean that
we have ψ0 = a = 1, and therefore, from (4) , γ0 =
1
2
. But when we have
γ0 =
1
2
, the inequality γ0 ≤ 23 is satisfied. As we have just pointed out, we are
precisely in a case where we always have Z > 0 under the bayesian approach,
and where therefore a decrease in σ2γ always worsens macroeconomic perfor-
mance. Thus, under the same simplifying assumption as the one made by
Sorensen (1991), the discrepancy betwween the result of Sorensen (1991) and
the result found in the present analysis in the bayesian case, disappears21.
Finally, proposition 5 indicates that when the distance from the bayesian
case is large enough, i.e. when we have α ≥ α∗(σ2γ, µ), then macroeconomic
performance is always improved by a lower variance of the central distrib-
ution (and strictly so, except in the special maximin case α = 1 where it
is unchanged). Therefore, the result obtained in the literature that a lower
variance might be beneficial, does not hold anymore when the distance from
the bayesian case, given by parameter α, becomes large enough (i.e. equal
or larger than the threshhold value α∗). From (9) this would tend to be the
case when either the aversion toward the imprecision of information, given
19Grüner (2002) examined the eﬀect of lower uncertainty on the variance inflation, but
did not explicitly considered its welfare eﬀect.
20See equation (14) p. 379 in Sorensen (1991). In the absence of unemployment shocks,
this equation always implies that macroeconomic performance is worsened by a decrease
in the variance of political uncertainty.
21However, whether we would also find an ambiguous result in the model of Sorensen
(1991) if this simplifying assumption was removed, as in the present analysis, is an open
issue. For the model of Sorensen (1991) is slightly diﬀerent from the one (taken from
Grüner (2002)) we use. First, instead of (2) , the labor union tries to minimize the devi-
ation of the real wage from a desired level which is too high (and also therefore creates
unemployment in the certainty case). Second, the exogenous variance is that of the rel-
ative weight ψ between inflation and unemployment in the central bank utility function,
while in the present analysis it directly concerns the coeﬃcient γ of the reaction function
of the central bank.
16
by parameter θ, or the imprecision of information, given by parameter δ, or
both, are suﬃciently large.
5.2.2 Global decrease in uncertainty
Consider now the case of a global reduction in uncertainty where both σ2γ
and µ decrease while the ratio λ ≡ σ
2
γ
µ2 is held constant. In section 4 we
have obtained that this also leads to a higher nominal wage in the case
where initially we had α < α∗. Therefore for the same reasons as in the case
of a decrease in σ2γ alone, macroeconomic performance may also be either
worsened or improved. We obtain:
Proposition 6 Consider a marginal global decrease in uncertainty where
both σ2γ and µ decrease while the ratio λ ≡
σ2γ
µ2 is held constant.
- In the case where initially we have α < α∗(σ2γ, µ), the sign of
dbΩMP
dµ
depends on the parameters of the model. Therefore, macroeconomic perfor-
mance may be either worsened or improved. In the case of a small amount
of uncertainty22 µ, then, at the first order, dbΩMPdµ can be shown to have the
same sign as X given by
X = (2− 3γ0)λµ− γ0 (1− γ0)α (23)
Therefore, (in the case of a small amount of uncertainty), a global reduction
in uncertainty (strictlty) worsens macroeconomic performance when we have
X > 0, and (strictlty) improves it when we have X < 0 (with no eﬀect on
macroeconomic performance when we have X = 0).
- In the case where initially we have α ≥ α∗(σ2γ, µ), we have ∂
bΩMP
∂µ < 0, and
consequently macroeconomic performance is then always strictly improved.
See appendix 6 for the proof. We obtain qualitative results which are
similar to the case of a reduction in σ2γ alone. Nonetheless, and although we
will not put too much emphasis on it, there are two diﬀerences which it may
be worthwhile to note. First, in the case α ≥ α∗(σ2γ, µ), where the nominal
wage is unchanged, macroeconomic performance is always strictly improved
(even in the maximin case α = 1).
Second, in the case α < α∗(σ2γ, µ), the condition under which macroeco-
nomic performance is worsened is diﬀerent in the non-bayesian case α 6= 023.
22In the general case, the condition is not easy to interpret, and we have given it explicitly
only in the case of small uncertainty.
23In the bayesian case α = 0, the criterion becomes the expected utility under the central
distribution and therefore parameter µ has no eﬀect in itself. As a consequence, starting
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Parameter α does not appear to have the same qualitative role for the issue
considered. In particular, from (22) , we see that Z is an increasing function
of α, while from (23) we get that X is a decreasing function of α.
One of the origins of these diﬀerences lies in the diﬀerent eﬀects that
the two kinds of reduced uncertainty have on the favorable channel going
through a lower coeﬃcient Q. It can be seen that parameter α has eﬀects of
opposite signs on this channel in the two cases considered: from (21) we get
∂
∂α
³
∂Q(σ2γ ,µ)
∂σ2γ
´
= − 1
1−γ0
< 0 in the first case, and ∂∂α
³
dQ(σ2γ ,µ)
dµ
´
= 2µ(1−λ)
1−γ0
≥ 0
in the second case. Therefore, when α gets larger, this favorable channel gets
smaller in the case of a decrease in σ2γ alone, while on the contrary it gets
larger in the case of a global decrease in uncertainty.
5.2.3 Decrease in the imprecision of information
We consider a decrease in parameter δ, holding σ2γ and µ constant. We have
seen that when there is less imprecision of information, then the nominal wage
is either lowered or unchanged (proposition 4). As a consequence, macroeco-
nomic performance is improved, or at most unchanged in some special cases.
More precisely, we get:
Proposition 7 In the non bayesian case θ 6= 0, a decrease in the imprecision
of information (a lower value of δ), always (strictly) improves macroeconomic
performance when we have σγ 6= µ. In the special case σγ = µ, macroeco-
nomic performance is (stricly) improved whenever, according to proposition
4, the nominal wage is strictly lower; and is left unchanged when the nominal
wage stays the same.
In the bayesian case θ = 0, a decrease in the imprecision of information
has no eﬀect on macroeconomic performance.
See appendix 7 for the proof. This result indicates that when we consider
a change in the imprecision of information (or in "Knightian uncertainty"),
we obtain a result which is opposite to the one emphasized in the literature
under the bayesian approach. A reduction in this kind of uncertainty always
improve macroeconomic performance (or leave it unchanged in some special
from the same initial situation where we have σ2γ = λµ
2, the two cases of a decrease in σγ
(alone, and associated to a proportional decrease in µ), should lead to the same condition
for having a worsened economic performance. This appears in the conditions given in
propositions 5 and 6. For in the case α = 0, (22) gives 2γ0 − 3γ20 + λµ2 > 0. When µ is
small, λµ2 is a second order term and thererfore, at the first order, the condition becomes
γ0 (2− 3γ0) > 0. From (23) , this is actually identical to the condition X > 0 in the case
α = 0.
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cases, as in the bayesian case θ = 0). In general, this occurs both through a
reduced nominal wage, and through the favorable eﬀect that less uncertainty
has for a given nominal wage (through a lower coeﬃcient Q in (20)). Thus,
less political uncertainty, or more transparency of the central bank, would
be beneficial if it mainly takes the form of a lower amount of Knightian
uncertainty, i.e. of a reduction in the imprecision of information.
6 Conclusion
The existing literature has developed the argument that less political uncer-
tainty, or more transparency of the central bank, may worsen macroeconic
performance by raising the nominal wage. The argument relies on the analy-
sis of the game between a labor union and the central bank. The labor union
is assumed to be uncertain about the utility function of the central bank,
which creates an uncertainty in the way the central bank reacts to the nomi-
nal wage set by the labor union. As the labor union (which plays first in the
game considered) takes into account this reaction function of the central bank
when it sets its nominal wage, less uncertainty has been shown to increase
the nominal wage. This in turn could worsen macroeconomic performance.
The underlying analysis was done under the traditional bayesian frame-
work of expected utility maximization. In the present paper, we have ex-
tended this analysis to a non-bayesian framework, which takes into account
what has been called an "aversion to ambiguity" in the literature. We have
taken from the existing literature a version of this non bayesian approach
which allows us to explicitly introduce the information available to the de-
cision maker and to evaluate and compare diﬀerent prior informations. The
information available to the decision maker then consists in two parts: first,
a central distribution on the relevant parameter; second, some imprecision
around this central distribution.
We have found that the results obtained under the bayesian approach are
not necessarily valid when we consider this extended approach. Thus, less
uncertainty does not always lead to higher wages. On the contrary, the nom-
inal wage is even lower in some cases. In that respect, a crucial distinction
concerns the type of decrease in uncertainty we consider. Under the bayesian
approach, a reduction in uncertainty consists in a lower variance of the prob-
ability distribution considered. Under the present extended approach, the
amount of uncertainty of the information available is characterized by three
parameters: the variance of the central distribution; the length of the support
of the probability distributions; and a coeﬃcient characterizing the impre-
cision of information. Thus, we have considered three types of decreases in
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uncertainty. The first consists in a lower value of the variance of the central
distribution, keeping the other two parameters unchanged. The second is
a global decrease in uncertainty, where both the standard deviation of the
central distribution and the length of the support decrease proportionally,
while the imprecision of information parameter stays the same. In the third,
the central distribution is kept unchanged, and there is a decrease in the
imprecision of information. This last kind of reduction in uncertainty could
also be labelled a decrease in "Knigthian uncertainty".
In the first two cases of decreases in uncertainty, we have shown that
the results found under the bayesian approach in the literature could still
be valid when the distance from the bayesian case is not too large: a lower
value of the variance of the central distribution, or a lower amount of global
uncertainty, always lead to a higher nominal wage, and consequently may
worsen macroeconomic performance. However, when the distance from the
bayesian case becomes larger than some threshold value, the results obtained
under the bayesian approach do not hold anymore. In that case, the nom-
inal wage is unchanged and stays equal to the value it would have under
certainty. As a consequence, the eﬀect on macroeconomic performance of
reduced uncertainty is in general strictly beneficial, and at least can never
be harmful.
Furthemore, when we consider the third type of uncertainty reduction,
i.e. a decrease in the imprecision of information (or in "Knightian uncer-
tainty"), we find that, on the contrary, the nominal wage is either reduced
or unchanged. This implies that macroeconomic performance never deterio-
rates: it is strictly improved in general, and unaﬀected in some special cases,
as in the bayesian case where there is no aversion toward the imprecision
of information. Thus, the result found in the literature under the bayesian
approach that less uncertainty increases the nominal wage and consequently
may worsen macroeconomic performance, never holds when we consider a
reduction in "Knightian uncertainty".
The results we obtain under the present extended framework, draw our
attention to two kinds of considerations, which should lead to some additional
questions and research. First, these results emphasize that when the distance
from the bayesian case becomes too large (i.e. larger than some threshhold
value which depends on the other parameters of the model), less uncertainty,
whatever its type, improves macroeconomic performance. Therefore, the
result emphasized in the literature under the bayesian approach (i.e. that
macroeconomic performance may on the contrary be worsened), requires that
we are not too far from the bayesian case. If we try to apply the argument to
the issue of central bank transparency, for example, this would require that
we try to estimate how far, in a given situation, we are from the bayesian
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case24.
Second, the results also emphasize that a lower amount of uncertainty
may have diﬀerent implications, depending on the kind of decrease in uncer-
tainty we consider. While, as in the bayesian case, a decrease in the variance
of the central distribution, or a lower amount of global uncertainty, may
worsen macroeconomic performance, a decrease in "Knightian uncertainty",
i.e. a decrease in the imprecision of information, on the contrary always
improves it (or at most leaves it unchanged in some special cases, as in the
bayesian case). Thus, if we try to apply this analysis to the central bank
transparency issue, this raises new questions. In practice, what type of de-
crease in uncertainty does central bank transparency lead to? For instance,
does it mainly reduce proportionally all uncertainty, or does it mainly consist
in reducing the imprecision of information, making the information available
to the public closer to some central probability distribution? It might be that
some form of transparency leads to one type, and an other form to an other
type. If this happens, it would mean that a kind of central bank transparency
which reduces the imprecision of information (i.e. reduces "Knightian uncer-
tainty") might be preferable, at least according to the argument considered
in the present paper.
Appendices
1. Proof of proposition 1
In (8) consider first the issue of finding the probabilily distribution P
which minimizes EPULU where P ∈ R (S) is any distribution with support
[γ0 − µ, γ0 + µ] .
From (6) , ULU(γ,w) is a quadratic concave function of γ. As a con-
sequence, the probability distribution with support [γ0 − µ, γ0 + µ] which
minimizes EPULU is obtained either for the probability distribution which
gives γ = γ0 − µ with probability one, or for the probability distribution
which gives γ = γ0+µ with probability one. We get γ = γ0−µ as a solution
when we have ULU (γ0 − µ,w) ≤ ULU (γ0 + µ,w), which, using (6) and (10) ,
can be written 2µAa2γ0w [w − w (γ0)] ≤ 0. Therefore, as we have w (γ0) > 0,
the value γ = γ0−µ is a solution in the case 0 ≤ w ≤ w (γ0) , while γ = γ0+µ
is a solution in the cases w ≤ 0 and w ≥ w (γ0) (and there is indiﬀerence
between γ0 − µ and γ0 + µ when w = 0 or w = w (γ0)).
24In the present analysis, coeﬃcient α is an indicator of the distance from the bayesian
case. But this coeﬃcient is itself the product of two parameters: one represents the aversion
toward the imprecision of information (parameter θ); and the other represents the amount
of imprecision of information (parameter δ). Therefore both aspects would have to be
taken into account if we want to estimate this distance.
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Consider the function eΩLU(γ,w) defined by
eΩLU(γ,w) ≡ αULU(γ, w) + (1− α)ECULU(γ,w) (24)
Using (6) , we can see that eΩLU(γ,w) is a quadratic concave function of
w which is maximized for ew (γ) given by
ew (γ) = 1
Aa2
αγ + (1− α) γ0
αγ2 + (1− α) (γ20 + σ2γ)
(25)
On the interval ]−∞, 0] , as we just have shown, we haveminP∈R(S)EPULU =
ULU(γ0 + µ) and therefore, from (8) , we have Ω
LU = eΩLU(γ0 + µ,w). As a
consequence, on the interval ]−∞, 0], the value of w which maximizes ΩLU
is equal to min [ew(γ0 + µ), 0]. As we have ew(γ0 + µ) > 0, this is equal to 0.
On the interval [w (γ0) ,+∞[ we also have minP∈R(S)EPULU = ULU(γ0+µ),
and therefore the value of w which maximizes ΩLU on this interval is equal
to max[ew(γ0 + µ), w (γ0)]. Using (10) and (25) we can see that we always
have ew(γ0 + µ) < w (γ0) . Therefore, on the interval [w (γ0) ,+∞[ , the op-
timal value of w is w (γ0) . These results imply that 0 is (strictly) better
than any value of w which belongs to ]−∞, 0[ , and that w (γ0) is (strictly)
better than any value of w which belongs to ]w (γ0) ,+∞[ . As a conse-
quence, the value bw which maximizes ΩLU , given by (8) , has to belong
to the interval [0, w (γ0)] . But we have shown that on [0, w (γ0)] we have
minP∈R(S)EPULU = ULU(γ0 − µ), and therefore ΩLU = eΩLU(γ0 − µ,w). As
we have ew(γ0 − µ) > 0, this implies bw = min [ew(γ0 − µ), w (γ0)] . Using (10)
and (25), we get that min [ew(γ0 − µ), w (γ0)] is equal to ew(γ0−µ) in the case
α < α∗ and to w (γ0) in the case α > α
∗, ew(γ0 − µ) and w (γ0) being equal
in the case α = α∗. Finally, from (12) we get ∂ bw∂α = 1Aa2 (γ0−µ)(σ2γ+γ0µ)D2 > 0,
where D is the denominator which appears in (12) . Proposition 1 directly
follows. QED
2. Proof of proposition 2
From (11) we get ∂α
∗(µ,σ2γ)
∂σ2γ
> 0 and therefore α∗(σ2γ,1, µ) > α
∗(σ2γ,2, µ). In
the case α ≥ α∗(σ2γ,1, µ), this implies α > α∗(σ2γ,2, µ). Therefore, in that case,
from proposition 1, we get bw ¡σ2γ1, µ, δ¢ = bw ¡σ2γ2, µ, δ¢ = w (γ0) . Consider
now the case α < α∗(σ2γ,1, µ). As we have α
∗(σ2γ,1, µ) ≤ 1, this implies α < 1,
which, from (12) , gives
∂ bw(σ2γ ,µ,δ)
∂σ2γ
< 0. Therefore, if α ≤ α∗(σ2γ,2, µ), then
proposition 1 implies that when σ2γ decreases from σ
2
γ,1 to σ
2
γ,2, the nominal
wage stricly increases from bw ¡σ2γ1, µ, δ¢ to bw ¡σ2γ2, µ, δ¢, where both are less
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than w (γ0) . If α > α
∗(σ2γ,2, µ)), then, from proposition 1, the nominal wage
increases from bw ¡σ2γ1, µ, δ¢ < w (γ0) to bw ¡σ2γ2, µ, δ¢ = w (γ0) . QED
3. Proof of proposition 3
We replace σ2γ by λµ
2 in (11) and (12). From (11) we get dα
∗
dµ > 0.
When we have α < α∗, from (12) we find that d bwdµ has the sign of B ≡
α [γ20 + αµ
2 − 2µγ0 − (1− α)λµ2]−2 (1− α)λµ (γ0 − αµ) . Then, using (11) ,
the inequality α < α∗ gives (1− α)λµ > α (γ0 − µ) . This implies B <
α [γ20 + αµ
2 − 2µγ0 − αµ (γ0 − µ)]− 2α (γ0 − µ) (γ0 − αµ) , which gives B <
−αγ0 (γ0 − αµ) . As we have µ < γ0, this implies B < 0. We therefore have
d bw
dµ < 0 in the case α < α
∗. Then, the rest of the proof proceeds exactly as in
the proof of proposition 2. QED
4. Proof of proposition 4
From (12) , bw depends on δ through parameter α = θδ.We have α1 = θδ1
and α2 = θδ2. In the bayesian case θ = 0, we have α1 = α2 = 0 and
therefore bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ1¢ = bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ2¢ = bw ¡σ2γ, µ, 0¢ in all cases. In the non-
bayesian case θ 6= 0, we have α1 > α2. Consider first the case α2 < α∗(σ2γ, µ).
We have ∂ bw∂α > 0 when we have α < α∗(σ2γ, µ). Therefore, if we also have
α1 < α∗(σ2γ, µ), then from proposition 1, we get w (γ0) > bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ1¢ >bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ2¢; and if we have α1 ≥ α∗(σ2γ, µ), we get w (γ0) = bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ1¢ >bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ2¢. In the case α2 ≥ α∗(σ2γ, µ), the inequality α1 > α2 implies α1 >
α∗(σ2γ, µ), and therefore proposition 1 gives bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ1¢ = bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ2¢ =
w (γ0) . QED
5. Proof of proposition 5
From (20) , we have
∂bΩMP
∂σ2γ
= −a2 bwµ2Q ∂ bw
∂σ2γ
+ bw ∂Q
∂σ2γ
¶
(26)
In the case α ≥ α∗(σ2γ, µ), from proposition 2 we have ∂ bw∂σ2γ = 0. Therefore,
from (21) and (26) we get ∂bΩMP∂σ2γ = −a2 bw2 1−α1−γ0 . When we have α < 1, then
we get ∂bΩMP∂σ2γ < 0; while in the special case α = 1, we have ∂bΩMP∂σ2γ = 0.
In the case where α < α∗(σ2γ, µ) is satisfied, bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢ is given by (12) .
Using (12), (21) and (26) , we obtain after calculus ∂bΩMP∂σ2γ = G (1− α)Z,
where we have G > 0 and where Z is given by (22) . As we are in the case
α < α∗(σ2γ, µ), and as we have α
∗(σ2γ, µ) ≤ 1, we necessarily have α < 1,
which implies that ∂bΩMP∂σ2γ has the sign of Z. QED
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6. Proof of proposition 6
From (20) , we can write, as in (26) :
dbΩMP
dµ
= −a2 bwµ2Qdbw
dµ
+ bwdQ
dµ
¶
(27)
Replacing σ2γ by λµ
2 in (21), we get
dQ(σ2γ, µ)
dµ
=
2µ [α+ λ (1− α)]
1− γ0
> 0 (28)
In the case α ≥ α∗(σ2γ, µ), from proposition 3 we have d bwdµ = 0. Then,
(27) , (28), d bwdµ = 0 and bw 6= 0 give dbΩMPdµ < 0.
In the case α < α∗(σ2γ, µ), the nominal wage bw ¡σ2γ, µ, δ¢ is given by (12) .
Using (12) , (21), (27) and (28) , we obtain
dbΩMP
dµ
=
bw
AD2
H (29)
where H is given by
H = 2Q
µ
αD + (γ0 − αµ)
dD
dµ
¶
−D (γ0 − αµ)
dQ
dµ
(30)
and where D is the denominator which appears in (12) , which, once σ2γ has
been replaced by λµ2, is given by
D = α (γ0 − µ)2 + (1− α) (γ20 + λµ2) (31)
As we have bw > 0, (29) implies that dbΩMPdµ has the sign of H. From (21) ,
(28) , (30) and (31) , we can obtain an expression for H as a function of
the parameters of the model. To simplify, we will actually make explicit
this expression only in the case where parameter µ is small, and therefore
the amount of uncertainty is small. First, we can note that from (11) and
σ2γ = λµ
2, we get α∗ = λµ
2
µ(γ0−µ)+λµ2
, which, in the case where µ is small,
behaves as λµγ0 . Therefore, the condition α < α
∗ implies that α is also small,
with an order of magnitude as small or smaller than µ. Using this property
along with (21) , (28) , (30) and (31) , we can approximate H at the first
order. Then, we obtain H = 2γ
2
0X
1−γ0
, where X is given by (23) . Proposition 6
follows. QED
7. Proof of proposition 7
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From (9) and (21) we have ∂Q∂δ =
θ(µ2−σ2γ)
1−γ0
≥ 0. As we have σ2γ ≤ µ2, this
implies Q2 ≤ Q1. And according to proposition 4 we have bw2 ≤ bw1. From
(20) we can writebΩMP2 − bΩMP1 = −a2 [Q2 (bw2 − bw1) + bw1 (Q2 −Q1)] (32)
The inequalities Q > 0 , bw > 0, Q2 ≤ Q1 and bw2 ≤ bw1 then imply bΩMP2
≥ bΩMP1 .
As we have Q > 0 and bw > 0, then, from (32) , the previous inequality
is strict if and only if we have either Q2 < Q1 or bw2 < bw1 (or both). In the
case θ 6= 0, from the expression of ∂Q∂δ above, we have Q2 < Q1 if and only if
we have σγ < µ, which (as we always have σγ ≤ µ) is equivalent to σγ 6= µ.
From (9) in the case θ = 0, α is unchanged (and stays equal to zero).
Therefore, from proposition 1, bw is unchanged and, from (21) , Q is also
unchanged. Then (20) implies that bΩMP is unchanged. QED
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